刊讯｜SSCI 期刊《心智与语言》2023年第1-3期
2023-09-09
2023-09-07
2023-09-05
Mind & Language
Volume 38, Issue1-3, 2023
Mind & Language（SSCI一区，2022-2023 IF：2，排名：57/194）2023年第1-3期共刊文48篇，其中2023年第1期共发文16篇，论文涉及知觉体验、目的论、评价理论、未言说成分、深度神经网络、多义词等；2023年第2期共发文16篇，包括一篇热点评论，论文涉及意识的方法论难题、假设检验、符号论、产权幻觉等；2023年第3期共发文16篇，论文涉及条件句的相关性、工具-语言协同进化、语境理论、疼痛处理机制等。欢迎转发扩散！
往期推荐：
目录
ARTICLES
Issue 1
■ Beyond adverbialism: A new non-relational theory of perceptual experience, by Laura Gow, Pages 2–19
■Teleology beyond explanation, by Sehrang Joo, Sami R. Yousif, Joshua Knobe, Pages 20–41
■ Imitation and culture: What gives?, by Cecilia Heyes, Pages 42-63
■ The signaling function of sharing fake stories, by Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini, Pages 64-80
■ Evaluative theories in psychology and philosophy of emotion, by Fabrice Teroni, Pages 81-97
■ Articulating a framework for unarticulated constituents, by Ernesto Perini-Santos, Pages 98-118
■ Accounting for the preference for literal meanings in autism spectrum conditions, by Agustín Vicente, Ingrid Lossius Falkum, Pages 119-140
■ How thirst compels: An aggregation model of sensory motivation, by Matthew Fulkerson, Pages 141-155
■ Moving beyond content-specific computation in artificial neural networks, by Nicholas Shea, Pages 156-177
■ The notorious neurophilosophy of pain: A family resemblance approach to idiosyncrasy and generalizability, by Sabrina Coninx, Pages 178-197
■ The polysemy view of pain, by Michelle Liu, Pages 198-217
■ “I didn't mean to suggest anything like that!”: Deniability and context reconstruction, by Diana Mazzarella, Pages 218-236
■ Moral rationalism on the brain, by Joshua May, Pages 237-255
■ Explaining early generics: A linguistic model, by Wolfram Hinzen, Otávio Mattos, Pages 256-273■ Experiences of linguistic understanding as epistemic feelings, by Anna Drożdżowicz, Pages 274-295■ Should the teleosemanticist be afraid of semantic indeterminacy?, by Karl Bergman, 296-314Issue 2
■ Consciousness as a natural kind and the methodological puzzle of consciousness, by Henry Taylor, Pages 316-355■ Metaphysics of the Bayesian mind, by Justin Tiehen, Pages 336-354■ Don't trust Fodor's guide in Monte Carlo: Learning concepts by hypothesis testing without circularity, by Michael Deigan, Pages 355-373■ What is diffuse attention?, by Adrienne Prettyman, Pages 374-393■ Public language, private language, and subsymbolic theories of mind, by Gabe Dupre, Pages 394-412■ How (not) to underestimate unconscious perception, by Matthias Michel, Pages 413-430■ Misperceiving properties, by Boyd Millar, Pages 431-445■ Tracking representationalism and olfaction, by Błażej Skrzypulec, Pages 446-463■ Pretend play: More imitative than imaginative, by Heather V. Adair, Peter Carruthers, Pages 464-479■ Anorexia nervosa: Illusion in the sense of agency, by Amanda Evans, Pages 480-494■ Inter-temporal rationality without temporal representation, by Simon A. B. Brown, Pages 495-514■ On Mates's puzzle, by Andrés Soria-Ruiz, Pages 515-544■ Metalinguistic effects, by Ricardo Mena, Pages 545-565■ Rules of use, by Indrek Reiland, Pages 566-583■ The perspective-sensitivity of presuppositions, by Márta Abrusán, Pages 584-603CURRENT DIRECTIONS ESSAY■ The semantics of fiction, by Manuel García-Carpintero, Pages 604-618
Issue 3
■ “Must” implies “can”, by Miklós Kürthy, Fabio Del Prete, Luca Barlassina, Pages 620-643■ Decomposing relevance in conditionals, by Daniel Lassiter, Pages 644-668■ Pragmatic enrichment, issues and domain goals, by Tamara Dobler, Pages 669-692■ Focus on slurs, by Poppy Mankowitz, Ashley Shaw, Pages 693-710■ Stone tools, predictive processing and the evolution of language, by Ross Pain, Pages 711-731■ The rationality of eating disorders, by Stephen Gadsby, Pages 732-749■ Are machines radically contextualist?, by Ryan M. Nefdt, Pages 750-771■ “Philosophers care about the truth”: Descriptive/normative generics, by Olivier Lemeire, Pages 772-786■ A Bayesian interpretation of cross-linguistic ambiguity tests, by Christopher Langston, Pages 787-808■ Meaning and responsibility, by Ray Buchanan, Henry Ian Schiller, Pages 809-827■ Is pain modular?, by Laurenz Casser, Sam Clarke, Pages 828-846■ Perceiving agency, by Mason Westfall, Pages 847-865■ Aphantasia: In search of a theory, by Andrea Blomkvist, Pages 866-888■ Commitments and the sense of joint agency, by Víctor Fernández-Castro, Elisabeth Pacherie, Pages 889-906■ In search of the beat, by Tim Bayne, Iwan Williams, Pages 907-924■ The social epistemology of introspection, by Elmar Unnsteinsson, Pages 925-942
摘要
Laura Gow, Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK
Abstract All non-relational views of perceptual experience face Jackson's famous many-property problem. I argue that the original problem, and the existing responses to it, have focused too closely on the controversial terminology for which adverbialism is best known. We can also direct Jackson's many-property problem explicitly onto the adverbialist's metaphysics, generating a new challenge. The responses contemporary adverbialists and non-relationalists have made to the original objection are not successful against this challenge. We need a new non-relational account. I sketch an outline of a new theory, and motivate the view by explaining how it can respond successfully to this additional challenge.
Key words adverbialism, binding problem, many-property problem, non-relational, perception, perceptual experience
Sehrang Joo, Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, USA
Sami R. Yousif, Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, USA
Joshua Knobe, Program in Cognitive Science and Department of Philosophy, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, USA
Abstract People often think of objects teleologically. For instance, we might understand a hammer in terms of its purpose of driving in nails. But how should we understand teleological thinking in the first place? This paper separates mere teleology (simply ascribing a telos) and teleological explanation (thinking something is explained by its telos) by examining cases where an object was designed for one purpose but is now widely used for a different purpose. Across four experiments, we show that teleology judgments and teleological explanation judgments are dissociable, and identify three factors that influenced teleology judgments (and one that did not).
Key words explanation, function, purpose, teleology
Cecilia Heyes, All Souls College & Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
Abstract What is the relationship between imitation and culture? This article charts how definitions of imitation have changed in the last century, distinguishes three senses of “culture” used by contemporary evolutionists (Culture1–Culture3), and summarises current disagreement about the relationship between imitation and culture. The disagreement arises from ambiguities in the distinction between imitation and emulation, and confusion between two explanatory projects—the anthropocentric project and the cultural selection project. I argue that imitation gives cultural evolution an inheritance mechanism for communicative and gestural skills (but not technological skills), and cultural selection yields the cognitive mechanisms that make imitation possible.
Key words anthropocentrism, cultural selection, culture, cumulative cultural evolution, emulation, imitation
Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini, Union College, Schenectady, New York, USA
Abstract Why do people share or publicly engage with fake stories? Two possible answers come to mind: (a) people are deeply irrational and believe these stories to be true; or (b) they intend to deceive their audience. Both answers presuppose the idea that people put the stories forward as true. But I argue that in some cases, these outlandish (yet also very popular) stories function as signals of one's group membership. This signaling function can make better sense of why, despite their unusual nature or lack of a factual basis, some of these stories are so widespread.
Key words assertion, belief, fake news, misinformation, narratives, signaling
Fabrice Teroni, Department of Philosophy, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
Abstract In contemporary psychology and philosophy, influential theories approach the emotions via their relations to values and evaluations. My aim is to contribute to our understanding of how these evaluative theories in psychology and philosophy relate to one another. I first explain why this presupposes that we make up our minds about the relations between “molecular” and “molar” properties. The rest of my discussion explores some ways of understanding the relation between the molar and the molecular: as a relation of epistemological support, of identity or of the determinable-determinates type.
Key words appraisal theory, emotion, evaluative theories of emotions, molecular and molar appraisals, philosophy of emotion, psychology of emotions
Ernesto Perini-Santos, Philosophy Department, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Brazil
Abstract The truth-conditions of many utterances have components that do not correspond to any uttered morpheme. This happens because linguistic acts are always a supplement to whatever else is available to agents engaged in a conversation. Unarticulated constituents result from the informational trade-off between what is available in the situation of utterance and what needs to be linguistically articulated. Unarticulated constituents are constituents of propositions, that is, of classifying tools that are neutral with respect to the way in which what is given in a situation interacts with the words uttered.
Key words affordance, contextualism, non-sentential utterance, proposition, unarticulated constituent
Agustín Vicente, Department of Linguistics and Basque Studies, Ikerbasque & University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), Biscay, Spain
Ingrid Lossius Falkum, Department of Linguistics and Scandinavian Studies (ILN)/Department of Philosophy Classics, History of Art and Ideas (IFIKK), University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
Abstract Pragmatic difficulties are considered a hallmark of autism spectrum conditions (ASC), but remain poorly understood. We discuss and evaluate existing hypotheses regarding the literalism of ASC individuals, that is, their tendency for literal interpretations of non-literal communicative intentions. We present evidence that reveals a developmental stage at which neurotypical children also have a tendency for literalism and suggest an explanation for such behaviour that links it to other behavioural, rule-following, patterns typical of that age. We discuss evidence showing that strict adherence to rules is also widespread in ASC, and suggest that literalism might be linked to such rule-following behaviour.
Key words autism spectrum conditions, development, literalism, pragmatics, rule-following behaviour
Matthew Fulkerson, Philosophy, UC San Diego, La Jolla, California, USA
Abstract Many sensory states motivate. I offer an account of how such states compel intentional action. I focus on thirst as it is relatively simple in physiological and behavioral terms, it carries little theoretical baggage, and the motivational story for thirst seems likely to generalize. I argue that thirst motivates using a variety of flexible strategies, and that no single explanatory mechanism fully captures its motivational force. The resulting view, the aggregation model of sensory motivation, offers the most plausible account of how sensory states motivate.
Key words drive states, homeostatic mechanisms, motivation, pain, sensory systems, thirst
Nicholas Shea, Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London, London；Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford
Abstract A basic deep neural network (DNN) is trained to exhibit a large set of input–output dispositions. While being a good model of the way humans perform some tasks automatically, without deliberative reasoning, more is needed to approach human-like artificial intelligence. Analysing recent additions brings to light a distinction between two fundamentally different styles of computation: content-specific and non-content-specific computation (as first defined here). For example, deep episodic RL networks draw on both. So does human conceptual reasoning. Combining the two takes advantage of the complementary costs and benefits of each. It also offers a better model of human cognitive competence.
Key words computation, concepts, content-specific, deep neural networks, distributed representation, explicit memory
Sabrina Coninx, Institute for Philosophy II, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
Abstract Pain continues to be one of the most controversial subjects in neurophilosophy. One focus of current debates is the apparent absence of an ideal brain-based biomarker that could function as a coherent and distinct indicator for pain. One prominent reaction to this in the philosophical literature is scientific pain eliminativism. In this article, I argue for a non-eliminative alternative that builds on family resemblances and provides a useful heuristic in the tradeoff between the idiosyncrasy of the neural processes corresponding to different pain cases and the demand for generalizability in pain research.
Key words biomarker, family resemblance, idiosyncrasy, neuromarker, pain marker, scientific pain eliminativism
Michelle Liu, Department of Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, UK
Abstract Philosophers disagree about what the folk concept of pain is. This aricle criticises existing theories of the folk concept of pain, that is, the mental view, the bodily view, and the recently proposed polyeidic view. It puts forward an alternative proposal—the polysemy view—according to which pain terms like “sore”, “ache” and “hurt” are polysemous, where one sense refers to a mental state and another a bodily state, and the type of polysemy at issue reflects two distinct but related concepts of pain. Implications with respect to issues in philosophy of pain are also drawn.
Key words folk concept of pain, pain, polyeidic view of pain, polysemy
Diana Mazzarella, Cognitive Science Centre, University of Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, Switzerland
Abstract Verbal communication leaves room for interpretative disputes. Speakers can argue about what they mean by their words and negotiate their commitments in conversation. This article examines the deniability of implicitly communicated contents and addresses the question of what makes an act of denial seem more or less plausible to the addressee. I argue that denials bring about a process of reconstruction of the context of interpretation of the speaker's utterance and I illustrate how considerations of cognitive utility are the key determinant for distinguishing plausible from merely possible deniability.
Key words context, implicature, insinuation, plausible deniability, strategic speaker
Joshua May, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, Alabama, USA
Abstract I draw on neurobiological evidence to defend the rationalist thesis that moral judgments are essentially dependent on reasoning, not emotions (conceived as distinct from inference). The neuroscience reveals that moral cognition arises from domain-general capacities in the brain for inferring, in particular, the consequences of an agent's action, the agent's intent, and the rules or norms relevant to the context. Although these capacities entangle inference and affect, blurring the reason/emotion dichotomy does not preferentially support sentimentalism. The argument requires careful consideration of the empirical evidence (from neuroimaging to psychopathology) and philosophical analysis of the commitments of rationalism versus sentimentalism in ethics.
Key words acquired sociopathy, moral dilemmas, moral emotion, moral reasoning, psychopathy
Explaining early generics: A linguistic model
Wolfram Hinzen, Department of Translation and Language Sciences, Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain
Otávio Mattos, Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
Abstract Preschoolers naturally form mental representations that capture generic knowledge about object kinds. These have been considered to pose a special explanatory and learning challenge. We here argue for a new deductive model of them, where (i) the representations in question have a linguistic format from the start; (ii) they are inherently structurally simpler compared to reference to individuals or quantifications; and (iii) formed in communicative contexts because communication in humans is linked to language. In this model, specific language-related resources explain the scope and limits of the forms of knowledge obtained, illustrating how language and cognition develop in tandem.
Key words development, generics, grammar, language and cognition, quantification
Anna Drożdżowicz, Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Arts and Ideas, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
Abstract Language understanding comes with a particular kind of phenomenology. It is often observed that when listening to utterances in a familiar language, competent language users can have experiences of understanding the meanings of these utterances. The nature of such experiences is a much debated topic. In this paper, I develop a new proposal according to which experiences of understanding are a particular kind of epistemic feelings of fluency that result from evaluative monitoring processes. The perceptual experience that accompanies linguistic comprehension results from the deployment of early stage auditory processes of speech perception that lead to the recognition of words.
Key words epistemic feelings, experiences, linguistic understanding
Karl Bergman, Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
Abstract The teleosemantic indeterminacy problem has generated much discussion but no consensus. One possible solution is to accept indeterminacy as a real feature of some representations. I call this view “indeterminacy realism.” In this paper, I argue that indeterminacy realism should be treated as a serious option. By drawing an analogy with vagueness, I try to show that accepting the reality of indeterminacy would not be catastrophic for teleosemantics. I further argue that there are positive reasons to endorse indeterminacy realism. I end the paper by arguing that indeterminacy realism need not generalize viciously to the case of propositional attitudes.
Key words Millikan, Neander, semantic indeterminacy, teleosemantics, vagueness
Henry Taylor, Department of Philosophy, European Research Institute, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
Abstract A new research programme conceives of consciousness as a natural kind. One proposed virtue of this approach is that it can help resolve the methodological puzzle of consciousness, which involves distinguishing consciousness from cognitive access. The present article raises a novel problem for this approach. The problem is rooted in the fact that there may be episodes of conscious experience that have not been classified as such. I argue that conceiving of consciousness as a natural kind cannot distinguish consciousness from cognitive access.
Key words cognitive access, consciousness, global workspace theory, methodological puzzle, natural kinds, recurrent processing
Justin Tiehen, University of Puget Sound, Tacoma, Washington, USA
Abstract Recent years have seen a Bayesian revolution in cognitive science. In this paper, I work out the implications of this revolution for the metaphysics of mind. My central claim is that the Bayesian approach supports a novel empirical argument for normativism, the thesis that belief has a rational normative essence. The argument I develop draws in part on the causal powers subset account of realization, with the connection being that Bayesians often appeal to Marr's framework of levels of analysis, which carries with it multiple realizability claims that can be understood in terms of the subset model.
Key words Bayesian cognitive science, metaphysics, normativism, rationality, realization
Michael Deigan, Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA
Abstract Fodor argued that learning a concept by hypothesis testing would involve an impossible circularity. I show that Fodor's argument implicitly relies on the assumption that actually φ-ing entails an ability to φ. But this assumption is false in cases of φ-ing by luck, and just such luck is involved in testing hypotheses with the kinds of generative random sampling methods that many cognitive scientists take our minds to use. Concepts thus can be learned by hypothesis testing without circularity, and it is plausible that this is how humans in fact acquire at least some of their concepts.
Key words abilities, concept acquisition, concept learning, Fodor, hypothesis testing, sampling
Adrienne Prettyman, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, USA
Abstract This article defends a theory of diffuse attention and distinguishes it from focal attention. My view is motivated by evidence from psychology and neuroscience, which suggests that we can deploy visual selective attention in at least two ways: by focusing on a small number of items, or by diffusing attention over a group of items taken as a whole. I argue that diffuse attention is selective and can be object-based. It enables a subject to select an object to guide behavior, albeit in a different way than focusing does.
Key words attention, cognitive science, consciousness, perception, psychology, vision
Public language, private language, and subsymbolic theories of mind
Gabe Dupre, School of Social, Political, and Global Studies, Keele University, Staffordshire, UK
Abstract Language has long been a problem-case for subsymbolic theories of mind. The reason for this is obvious: Language seems essentially symbolic. However, recent work has developed a potential solution to this problem, arguing that linguistic symbols are public objects which augment a fundamentally subsymbolic mind, rather than components of cognitive symbol-processing. I shall argue that this strategy cannot work, on the grounds that human language acquisition consists in projecting linguistic structure onto environmental entities, rather than extracting this structure from them.
Key words bootstrapping, connectionism, developmental linguistics, extended mind, generative linguistics, symbolic cognition
How (not) to underestimate unconscious perception
Matthias Michel, University of Puget Sound, Tacoma, Washington, USA
Abstract Recent work questions whether previously reported unconscious perceptual effects are genuinely unconscious, or due to weak conscious perception. Some philosophers and psychologists react by rejecting unconscious perception or by holding that it has been overestimated. I argue that the most significant attack on unconscious perception commits the criterion content fallacy: the fallacy of interpreting evidence that observers were conscious of something as evidence that they were conscious of task-relevant features. This fallacy is prevalent in consciousness research: if unconscious perception exists, scientists could routinely underestimate it. I conclude with methodological recommendations for moving the debate forward.
Key words consciousness, criterion content fallacy, criterion problem, perceptual awareness scale, response bias, unconscious perception
Boyd Millar, Department of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri, USA
Abstract Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that property illusions—cases in which we perceive a property, but that property is not the property it seems to us to be in virtue of our perceptual experience—and veridical illusions—cases in which we veridically perceive an object's properties, but our experience of some specific property is nonetheless unsuccessful or illusory—can occur. I defend the contrary view. First, I maintain that there are compelling reasons to conclude that property illusions and veridical illusions cannot occur; and second, I maintain that the considerations supporting the possibility of such cases are uncompelling.
Key words hallucination, illusion, perceptual content, property perception, veridical illusion
Tracking representationalism and olfaction
Błażej Skrzypulec, Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
Abstract While philosophers of perception develop representational theories of olfactory experiences, there are doubts regarding whether features of olfactory perception can be accommodated within the representationalist framework. In particular, it is argued that the function of olfaction is not to represent stimuli but rather to evaluate it. The article claims that the major representational accounts of olfaction have problems in accommodating the evaluative aspects of olfactory phenomenology. However, an alternative position, named ‘olfactory evaluativism’, is proposed which is free of these problems and may serve as a foundation for further developments of representational approach to olfactory experiences.
Key words olfaction, olfactory valence, perception, phenomenal character, representational content, tracking representationalism
Heather V. Adair, Department of Philosophy, Susquehanna University, Selinsgrove, Pennsylvania, USA
Peter Carruthers, Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, Maryland, USA
Abstract Pretense is generally thought to constitutively involve imagination. We argue that this is a mistake. Although pretense often involves imagination, it need not; nor is it a kind of imagination. The core nature of pretense is closer to imitation than it is to imagination, and likely shares some of its motivation with the former. Three main strands of argument are presented. One is from the best explanation of cross-cultural data. Another is from task-analysis of instances of pretend play. And the third concerns the different ways in which pretense (especially childhood pretense) and imagination impact one's evaluative/affective systems.
Key words affect, cultural learning, imagination, imitation, play, pretense
Amanda Evans, Centre for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium
Abstract This paper first identifies and then provides a novel analysis of a feature of anorexia nervosa (AN) that has gone overlooked in the philosophy of psychiatry literature. This feature is the discrepancy between first-personal experiences of anorexic food restriction and the clinical descriptions of these same behaviors at the level of agentive awareness. I develop a positive account of the sense of agency in AN that accommodates current empirical findings while also providing valuable insight into how it is that anorexics can sincerely report feeling fully in control over their food restriction.
Key words agentive phenomenology, anorexia nervosa, illusory phenomenology, philosophy of psychiatry, philosophy of psychology, sense of agency
Simon A. B. Brown, Department of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, USA
Abstract Recent influential accounts of temporal representation—the use of mental representations with explicit temporal contents, such as before and after relations and durations—sharply distinguish representation from mere sensitivity. A common, important picture of inter-temporal rationality is that it consists in maximizing total expected discounted utility across time. By analyzing reinforcement learning algorithms, this article shows that, given such notions of temporal representation and inter-temporal rationality, it would be possible for an agent to achieve inter-temporal rationality without temporal representation. It then explores potential upshots of this result for theorizing about rationality and representation.
Key words diachronic rationality, inter-temporal choice, inter-temporal rationality, representation, temporal cognition, temporal representation
Andrés Soria-Ruiz, ArgLab, Nova Institute of Philosophy, School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Universidade NOVA de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal
Abstract I defend a metalinguistic account of Mates's puzzle: sentences where synonymous expressions cannot be substituted salva veritate. If Andrea thinks that attorneys are different from lawyers, and she thinks that Fiona is the former but not the latter, we may hesitate to substitute ‘lawyer’ for ‘attorney’ in ‘Andrea believes that Fiona is an attorney’, even though ‘lawyer’ and ‘attorney’ are synonymous. I argue that these sentences report de re beliefs about linguistic expressions, thereby blocking such substitutions, and I offer a compositional derivation of their meaning.
Key words attitude reports, concept generators, de re, Mates's puzzle, metalinguistic
Ricardo Mena, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (IIF-UNAM), Ciudad de México, Mexico
Abstract We can communicate linguistic information by asserting sentences that are not explicitly about linguistic matters. Stalnaker offers a pragmatic account of this phenomenon. It is not clear that such an account is correct. In this article I offer an alternative account that does not rely on pragmatic mechanisms and which captures many of the insights in Stalnaker's theory of linguistic communication. The view is inspired by Barker's semantics of vague adjectives.
Key words linguistic communication, metalinguistic interpretations, philosophy of language, semantics
Indrek Reiland, Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
Abstract In the middle of the 20th century, it was a common Wittgenstein-inspired idea in philosophy that for a linguistic expression to have a meaning is for it to be governed by a rule of use. Nowadays this idea is widely taken to be mysterious, inconsistent with “truth-conditional semantics,” and subject to the Frege–Geach problem. In this article, I reinvigorate the idea by sketching the rule-governance view of the nature of linguistic meaningfulness, showing that it is not subject to the two problems, explaining its lasting appeal to philosophers from Strawson to Kaplan, and why we should find it continually attractive.
Key words meaning, norm, rule, semantics, use-condition
The perspective-sensitivity of presuppositions
Márta Abrusán, Institut Jean Nicod, Département d'études Cognitives, ENS, EHESS, PSL Research University, CNRS, Paris, France
Abstract Presuppositions are perspective-sensitive: They may be evaluated with respect to the beliefs of a salient protagonist. This happens not only in well-known cases of perspective shift such as free indirect discourse, but also when the perspective shift is less obvious, but still present, such as in examples of so-called protagonist projection. In this paper, I show that this simple observation explains many puzzling facts noted in connection with presuppositions over the last 50 years, concerning, for example, emotive and cognitive factives, temporal clauses, and reason clauses.
Key words factives, free indirect discourse, perspective shift, presuppositions, protagonist projection, reason clauses
The semantics of fiction
Manuel García-Carpintero, LOGOS/BIAP, Departament de Filosofia, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
Abstract The paper reviews proposals by Abell, Predelli, and others on the semantics of fiction, focusing on the discourse through which fictions are created. Predelli develops the radical fictionalism of former writers like Kripke and van Inwagen, according to which that discourse is contentless and does not express propositions. This paper offers reasons to doubt these claims. It then explores realist proposals like Abell's in which singular terms in fictions refer to fictional characters, understood as socially created representational artifacts, and irrealist alternatives in which the discourse is fully meaningful even though those terms fail to refer.
Key words fiction, fictional content, fictional entities, fictionality, reference in fiction
“Must” implies “can”
Miklós Kürthy, Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
Fabio Del Prete, CLLE, CNRS & University of Toulouse II, Toulouse, France
Luca Barlassina, Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
Abstract We consider the thorny issue of whether ascribing to an agent the obligation to φ implies that it is possible for the agent to φ. Traditionally, this issue has been interpreted as whether “ought” implies “can”. But another linguistic interpretation is available, namely, whether “must” implies “can” (MIC). We show that “must” does imply “can” via a convergent argument. First, we prove MIC from a well-established theory of modality in natural language, namely, that proposed by Kratzer. Second, we present novel acceptability judgement studies showing that MIC predicts and explains the linguistic behaviour of native English speakers.
Key words experimental philosophy, modality, obligation, ought implies can, semantics
Daniel Lassiter, Linguistics & English Language, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
Abstract Conditionals frequently convey that the antecedent is relevant to the consequent. Recently many authors have argued that this relevance is part of the conventional meaning of conditionals, but this approach fails to account for many examples where a conditional is used to convey irrelevance of antecedent to consequent. Both types of conditionals are best explained by a conventional meaning with no relevance requirement, and a separate process of coherence establishment among successive clauses in discourse. This account is supported by the distribution of discourse particles and is able to account for experimental studies used to support the conventionalist position.
Key words conditionals, discourse coherence, discourse particles, pragmatics, relevance
Tamara Dobler, Institute for Logic, Language, and Computation | Amsterdam University College, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
Abstract In this article, I propose an inquisitive approach to semantic underdetermination using the model of issue resolution to describe how occasion meanings are determined in the process of pragmatic enrichment. I appeal to “Travis cases” to motivate the account of semantic underdetermination based on alternative ways for some object a to be F. When interpreting a sentence, we look how to narrow down the space of metalinguistic alternatives and achieve the state where a metalinguistic issue is resolved. I suggest that, in doing this, we primarily rely on contextual domain goals, preferring those alternatives which are conducive to the goal.
Key words inquisitive semantics, occasion-sensitivity, pragmatic enrichment, QUD, semantic underdetermination, Travis cases
Poppy Mankowitz, Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
Ashley Shaw, School of Philosophy, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
Abstract Slurring expressions display puzzling behaviour when embedded, such as under negation and in attitude and speech reports. They frequently appear to retain their characteristic qualities, like offensiveness and propensity to derogate. Yet it is sometimes possible to understand them as lacking these qualities. A theory of slurring expressions should explain this variability. We develop an explanation that deploys the linguistic notion of focus. Our proposal is that a speaker can conversationally implicate metalinguistic claims about the aptness of a focused slurring expression. This explanation of variability relies on independently motivated mechanisms and is compatible with any theory of slurring expressions.
Key words focus, implicature, metalinguistic, pragmatics, slurs
Ross Pain, School of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, Australia
Abstract Recent work by Stout and colleagues indicates that the neural correlates of language and Early Stone Age toolmaking overlap significantly. The aim of this paper is to add computational detail to their findings. I use an error minimisation model to outline where the information processing overlap between toolmaking and language lies. I argue that the Early Stone Age signals the emergence of complex structured representations. I then highlight a feature of my account: It allows us to understand the early evolution of syntax in terms of an increase in the number and complexity of models in a cognitive system, rather than the development of new types of processing.
Key words evolution of language, evolutionary cognitive archaeology, gradualism, predictive processing, tool-language co-evolution
Stephen Gadsby, Cognition and Philosophy Laboratory, Department of Philosophy, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, Australia; Centre for Philosophical Psychology, Department of Philosophy, University of Antwerp, Antwerpen, Belgium
Abstract Sufferers of eating disorders often hold false beliefs about their own body size. Such beliefs appear to violate norms of rationality, being neither grounded by nor responsive to appropriate forms of evidence. I defend the rationality of these beliefs. I argue that they are in fact supported by appropriate evidence, emanating from proprioceptive misperception of bodily boundaries. This argument has far-reaching implications for the explanation and treatment of eating disorders, as well as debates over the relationship between rationality and human psychology.
Key words anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, eating disorders, epistemic akrasia, rationality, treatment
Ryan M. Nefdt, Department of Philosophy, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa
Abstract In this article, I describe a novel position on the semantics of artificial intelligence. I present a problem for the current artificial neural networks used in machine learning, specifically with relation to natural language tasks. I then propose that from a metasemantic level, meaning in machines can best be interpreted as radically contextualist. Finally, I consider what this might mean for human-level semantic competence from a comparative perspective.
Key words artificial intelligence, cognitive science, deep learning, machine learning, metasemantics, radical contextualism
Olivier Lemeire, Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
Abstract Some generic generalizations have both a descriptive and a normative reading. The generic sentence “Philosophers care about the truth”, for instance, can be read as describing what philosophers in fact care about, but can also be read as prescribing philosophers to care about the truth. On Leslie's account, this generic sentence has two readings due to the polysemy of the kind term “philosopher”. In this article, I first argue against this polysemy account of descriptive/normative generics. In response, a contextualist semantic theory for generic sentences is introduced. Based on this theory, I argue that descriptive/normative generics are contextually underspecified.
Key words contextualism, dual character concepts, generics, normative generics, polysemy
Christopher Langston, Department of Neurology, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, Bronx, New York, USA
Abstract Cross-linguistic comparisons serve as empirical tests generating evidence for and against lexical ambiguity in words like “good”, “know”, “the”, “can”, and “may”. Critics question such comparisons' validity. This article examines how cross-linguistic comparisons are treated as tests and shows that they have two predominant forms: one modeled on modus tollens, and another on Bayes' theorem, where the former is an enthymematic version of the latter. This analysis reveals the strengths and weaknesses of cross-linguistic comparisons, and thereby guides interpretation of their results. It concludes that cross-linguistic comparisons generally yield stronger evidence against lexical ambiguity than for it.
Key words ambiguity, Bayes' theorem, Bayesian, good, know, modality
Ray Buchanan, Department of Philosophy, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas, USA
Henry Ian Schiller, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri, USA
Abstract In performing an act of assertion we are sometimes responsible for more than the content of the literal meaning of the words we have used, sometimes less. A recently popular research program seeks to explain certain of the commitments we make in speech in terms of responsiveness to the conversational subject matter. We raise some issues for this view with the aim of providing a more general account of linguistic commitment: one that is grounded in a more general action-theoretic notion of responsibility.
Key words assertion, commitment, exculpature, intentionalism, loose talk, subject matter
Laurenz Casser, Department of Philosophy, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas, USA
Sam Clarke, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA; University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California, USA
Abstract We suggest that pain processing has a modular architecture. We begin by motivating the (widely assumed but seldom defended) conjecture that pain processing comprises inferential mechanisms. We then note that pain exhibits a characteristic form of judgement independence. On the assumption that pain processing is inferential, we argue that its judgement independence is indicative of modular (encapsulated) mechanisms. Indeed, we go further, suggesting that it renders the modularity of pain mechanisms a default hypothesis to be embraced pending convincing counterevidence. Finally, we consider what a modular pain architecture might look like, and question alleged counterevidence to our proposal.
Key words cognitive penetration, encapsulation, modularity, pain, placebo analgesia
Mason Westfall, Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Abstract When we look around us, some things look “alive,” others do not. What is it to “look alive”—to perceive animacy? Empirical work supports the view that animacy is genuinely perceptual. We should construe perception of animacy as perception of agents and behavior. This proposal explains how static and dynamic animacy cues relate, and explains how animacy perception relates to social cognition more broadly. Animacy perception draws attention to objects that are apt to be well-understood folk psychologically, enabling us to marshal our folk psychological resources efficiently.
Key words agency, animacy, mind, perception, social cognition
Andrea Blomkvist, Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
Abstract Though researchers working on congenital aphantasia (henceforth “aphantasia”) agree that this condition involves an impairment in the ability to voluntarily generate visual imagery, disagreement looms large as to which other impairments are exhibited by aphantasic subjects. This article offers the first extensive review of studies on aphantasia, and proposes that aphantasic subjects exhibit a cluster of impairments. It puts forward a novel cognitive theory of aphantasia, building on the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis of memory and imagination. It argues that aphantasia is best explained as a malfunction of processes in the episodic system, and is therefore an episodic system condition.
Key words aphantasia, cognitive architecture, episodic memory, episodic system, imagination, mental imagery
Víctor Fernández-Castro, Philosophy Department I, University of Granada, Granada, Spain
Elisabeth Pacherie, Institut Jean Nicod, UMR8129, CNRS, DEC, ENS, PSL University, Paris, France
Abstract The purpose of this article is to explore the role commitments may play in shaping our sense of joint agency. First, we propose that commitments may contribute to the generation of the sense of joint agency by stabilizing expectations and improving predictability. Second, we argue that commitments have a normative element that may bolster an agent's sense of control over the joint action and help counterbalance the potentially disruptive effects of asymmetries among agents. Finally, we discuss how commitments may contribute to make acting jointly emotionally rewarding, both by improving coordination and by inducing or reinforcing the circumstances under which shared emotions emerge among co-agents.
Key words action predictability, commitments, joint action, normative control, sense of joint agency, shared emotions
Tim Bayne, Philosophy Department (SOPHIS), Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
Iwan Williams, Philosophy Department (SOPHIS), Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia; Monash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
Abstract Beat perception has received very little attention from either philosophers of mind or philosophers of music. This neglect is unfortunate, for the topic is rich with philosophical interest. This article addresses two questions. The first concerns the nature of our experience of musical beat. Here, we argue that experiences of beat are forms of auditory perception. The second question concerns the nature of musical beat itself: what are beats? We defend a form of anthropocentric realism about beats: beats are mind-independent properties of sound sequences whose nature can be understood only in relation to our perceptual capacities.
Key words beat perception, musical meter, perceptual content, realism, response-dependence
Elmar Unnsteinsson, School of Philosophy, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland, School of Humanities, University of Iceland, Reykjavík, Iceland
Abstract I argue that introspection recruits the same mental mechanism as that which is required for the production of ordinary speech acts. In introspection, in effect, we intentionally tell ourselves that we are in some mental state, aiming thereby to produce belief about that state in ourselves. On one popular view of speech acts, however, this is precisely what speakers do when speaking to others. On this basis, I argue that every bias discovered by social epistemology applies to introspection and other forms of self-directed representation. If so, it becomes unclear in what sense social epistemology is social.
Key words Gricean pragmatics, insincerity, introspection, self-deception, social epistemology
期刊简介
The phenomena of mind and language are currently studied by researchers in linguistics, philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, cognitive anthropology and cognitive archaeology. Mind & Language brings this work together in a genuinely interdisciplinary way. Along with original articles, the journal publishes forums, survey articles and reviews, enabling researchers to keep up-to-date with developments in related disciplines as well as their own.
目前，语言学、哲学、心理学、人工智能、认知人类学和认知考古学的研究人员正在研究心理和语言现象。Mind & Language 以真正跨学科的方式将这些研究工作结合在一起。除了原创文章，该期刊还发表论坛、调查文章和评论，使研究人员能够及时了解相关学科以及他们自己所在学科的最新发展。
It is an important forum for sharing the results of investigation and for creating the conditions for a fusion of effort, thus making real progress towards a deeper and more far-reaching understanding of the phenomena of mind and language.
它是一个重要的论坛，学者们可以在这里分享调查结果并为合作研究创造条件，从而真正更深入、更深远地理解思维和语言现象。
官网地址：
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14680017
本文来源：Mind & Language官网
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